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I. Statement of the Case
1. Nature of tlze Case. This is an appeal from a grant ofpartial su~n~nary
judgment in

favor of Plaintiff-Responde~ltin an action for partition of real estate located in Madison County,
Idaho pursuant to Idaho Code $ 6-501 et. seq., and for an accounting of receipts and
disburse~nentsreceived by Defendants-Appellants on account of said property.
2. Ideiztificatioiz ofPnrties. Plaintiff-Respondent, Madison Real Property, LLC,

(hereafter referred to as "Madison Real Property") is an Idaho limited liability company and is
the owner of a one-third interest in the real estate which is the subject of this action. DefendantsAppellants, Marilynn Thonlason and Byron Thomason, husband and wife, are owners of a onethird interest in the real estate which is the subject of tlGs action. Defendants-Appellants,
Nicl~olasThomason and Sandra Tho'mason, husband and wife, are owners of aone-tlurd interest
in the real estate which is the subject of flus action. The appellants will be referred to herein as
the "Thomasons" unless fewer than all of tliem are being referenced.
3. Course of the Proceedings.

Madison Real Property filed its cornplaint for partition and an accounting on April 4,
2008. R. Vol. I., p. 6. Marilynn Tllomason and Byron Tho~nasonwere served the sulnlnons and
co~l~plaint
on April 4, 2008. R.Vol. l., p. 6. Nicholas and Sandra Tl~omasonwere senled t l ~ e
s u n u ~ ~and
o~~
complaint
s
on April 5, 2008. R. Vol. l., p. 6. Defendants Marilyml Thomson and
Byron Tl~omasonfiled their answers to Madison Real pro pert)^'^ complaint on Apiil24,2008. R.
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Vol. 1., p. 6. Defendants Nicholas and Sandra Thomason filed their answers to plaintiff's
complaint on April 25,2008. R. Vol. I., p. 6.
Defei~dantsMarilynn and Byron Thomason filed a motion to dismiss on May 27,2008,
which was denied by a11 order of the court on June 16,2008. R. Vol. l., p. 6.
On July 7,2008 Nicliolas Thornason filed a Notice of service of his First Request for
Production to Plaintiff R. Vol. I., p. 6. That same date Byron Thomason filed his Notice of
Service of Defendant Byron T. Thomason's First Request for Adinissions to the Plaintiff. R. Vol.
1., p. 7. On July 31,2008 Madison Real Property filed its Notice of Compliance with Defendant
Byron T.Tllomason's First and Second Requests for Admission, and its Notice of Cornpliance
with Defendant Nicholas A. Thomason's First Request for Production. R. Vol. 1., p. 7. The
T11omasons.have not served any other discovery requests at any time.
On July 11,2008, Madison Real Property filed and served on the Tliomasons its Motion
for Partial Summary Judgment in which it aslted the district court to enter judgment on the issue
of ownership of the subject real estate, incIuding the respective rights of the parties in tile
property. That the court order a physical partition of the subject property and appointment of
referees and the I-ight of the plaintiff to receive an accouilting for all receipts and disbursenleilts
received and made on account of said propnty fi.0111October 30,2001, or for such other use
made of the property by defendants. A Notice of Hearing scheduled for August 18, 2008 was
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filed and served on the Thomasons. Record of Action, p. 2', R, Vol. 2., p. 239-240. Madison
Real Properly also filed and served an Affidavit in support of its lnotion and a Brief in support of
its motion on July 11,2008. R. Vol. I., pp. 7. No objection, briefs, affidavits or other opposition
to the motion for suminary judgment was filed by the Thomasons. Record of Action, p. 2 and 3.
On August 15,2008, a motion for contilluance was filed by Byron and Marilynn Thoinason.
Record of Action, p. 2. R. Vol. 3., pp. 308, 327. The hearing on Madison Real Property's motion
for partial summaryjudgment was held on August 18,2008. Record of Action, p. 2. The motion
for continuance by Byron and Marilynn Thomason was denied, the district court finding that it
was not timely nor supported by argument. R. Vol. 2., p. 243. On August 22,2008, the district
court entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Partial Summary
Judgment. R. Voi. 2.', p. 244. On September 8, 2008 the district court entered an Order
Appointing Referees. R. Vol. 2., p. 265. On September 16, 2008 the district court entered an

'

Order Awarding Attorneys fees and costs. R. Vol. 2., p. 268.
Thoinasons filed a Notice ofAppeal on October 1,2008. R. Vol. 3., p. 284. This appeal
was conditionally dislnissed by the Suprelne Court as untimely on October 16, 2008. On
November 20,2008, this appeal was finally dismissed. R.Vol. 4., pp. 645, 672, 683.
On October 6,2008, the Thon~asonsfiled a Motion for Stay of Judgine~~t,
New
TrialiHearing, to A111end ljil~diilgsand Conclusions, Ame11d Judgi~~ent
and All Other Authority.
'The Register &Action is located in Volume I . of the Clerk's Record and is not
paginated.
Respondent's Brief
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Register of Actions, p. 3. Madison Real Property filed its Reply and Objection to the Thomasons'
Motions on October 14,2008. Register of Action, p. 3 and R. Vol. 4., p. 634. A hearing was held
on the Tl-iomasons' various motions on October 20, 2008. Record of Actions, p. 4. The district
court entered its Order denying Tl~omasons'motions and granting Madison Real Property
attorney fees on October 20,2008. R. Vol. 4.p. 667.
Pursuant to its findings in its October 20,2008 Order, the district court issued a Second
Order Awarding Attorneys Fees and Costs on November 14,2008. R. Vol. 2., p. 670.
On December 23,2008 Byron and Marilynn Tl~ollzasonfiled their Joint Appeal on Order
November 14,2008. R. Vol. 4. 684, 697, 698. Nicholas and Sandra did not file a notice of appeal
but have signed the brief with Byron and Marilym. No other notice of appeal has been filed since
the filing ofthe December 23,2008 notice of appeal.
The referees filed their report with the district coufi on December 2, 2008. R. Vol. 4.,
p.
623. Madison Real Property filed a Motion for Order Confirming tlle Referees Report and for
Judginent on December 19,2008. R. Vol. 4., p. 794. A hearing was held oil the motion on April
27,2009. R. Vol. 4.p. 700. The district court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order
confizlnillg tlle referees' report on June 12,2009.
The Tllomasons' tl~enfiled tluee liiotions includi~ig(1 .) Defeiidallts' Joint Motion for
R. Vol. 4, p.
Reconsideration, filed June 26,2009 by B p l l Tliornason and Marily~mTl~o~ilason.
718; (2.) Defei~dants'Joiner Joint Motion fo1-Reconsideration Fraud Upon the Court, filed July

Respondent's Brief

Page 4

8>2009 by Nicholas Thomason, Sandra Thomason, Byron Tholnason and Marilynn Thornason.

R. Vol. 4., p. 734A; and (3.) Joint Objection and Second Motion for.Reconsideration July 15,
2009 Order, filed July 20,2009 (one such motion from Byron, Marilynn and Nicllolas Thomason
and an identical one from Sandra Thomason). R. Vol. 4., p. 816. Tile district court held a hearing
p. 839. The district court entered its Order
on these motions on August 10, 2009. R. Vol. 4.,
Denying the Thomasons' Motions for Reconsideration on August i 1,2009. R. Vol. 4., p. 846.
4. Statement of thefacts.

Prior to partition, Madison Real Property was the owner of a one-third undivided interest
in a 75 acre tract of farm pound located in Madison Couilty, Idaho generally referred to as the
"Fanlistead" by the parties. R. Vol. I., p. 51-52, Madison Real Property is the successor in
interest to William Forsberg who received his.one-third undivided interest in the Farmstead by a
deed from Greg and Diana Thomason recorded October 30,2001 and a correction warranty deed
recorded March 29,2002. R. Vol. 1., pp. 85 and 86. Marilynn and Byroll Tholnason were the
owners of a one-third undivided interest in the farmstead property. Nicholas and Sandra
Thomason were the owners of a one-third undivided interest in tile farnlstead property. R. Vol.
2., p. 166.
Tile Tl~omasonsbrougllt suit against Madison Real Propnty's predecessor in interest,
Willianl Forsbe~g,in the United States Ba~kruptcyCourt for tile District of Idaho, seelcing
anlong other tl~ings,to quiet title to t11e Farnlsteacl Property in Tholnason Fanns, Inc. R. Vol. 1.,
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pp. 53, 59, 60, 63, 64. Forsberg answered and counterclaimed denying all of tl~eThomasons'
allegations and requesting that the banlmptcy court quiet title in a one-third undivided interest in
the Farmstead properly in him. R. Vol. 2., p. 174-180.Following a trial on the merits, in a
Mernoranduln Decision dated June 9,2006, the Banlmptcy Court found against the Thomasons
and in favor of the Forsbergs on all claims. In a final judgment dated October 3,2006, the
banIuuptcy court then quieted title to a one-tl~irdundivided fee simple interest in the Farinstead
Property in William Forsberg subject to any community interest ofhis spouse. R. FiPrh Affidavit
of William Forsberg, Exhibit 24, p. 78.'
The Thomasons appealed the bankruptcy court's decision against them to the Ba~luuptcy
Appellate Panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. Their appeal was denied and the
banluuptcy couri'sdecisionupheld in all respects by Judgn1ententered August 7, 2007. R. Fifth
Affidavit of William Forsberg, Exhibit 25, p. 2 of the Memorandum. No furtl~exappeal was talten
from this decision. R. Vol. l., p. 122.
On September 11,2007, the Thornasons filed a document wit11 the Banlmptcy Court
entitled "Joint Affidavits of Nicllolas A. Thomason and Byron T. Tl~ornaso~~"
which included
within it an attached doculneirt entitled "Demand for Retrial Fraud U ~ o nthe Court." R. Vol. 1 .,

pp. 87-106.

This affidavit and its exhibits were submitted by the Clerk of the District Court will1 the
Record herein. See R. Vol. 4., second lo the last page (Certificate of Exhibits).
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On October 26,2007 Byron Thomason filed an Affidavit of Plaintiff, Byron T.
Tilomason, Fraud On the Court Balzlvuptcy Fraud, Exhibits & Clailns wit11 a supplenlei~t
consisting of Exhibits A through I and Exhibits I through 3. R. Vol. 3., pp. 361-630. The
documellt purported to detail, among other things, alleged acts and omissions by William
Forsberg in concert with Greg and Diana Thomason, the banlcruptcy trustee and other defendants
which were characterized as fraud, fraud on the court, real estate fraud and crimes, which should
have voided the conveyance of the Fannstead property. R. Vol. 3., pp. 386,391,395-396.
A hearing was held on the Thomasons' motion for relief from judgmei~tand for a new

trial on October 31, 2007. R. Vol. l., p. 117; Vol. 2., p.153. The banlmptcy coui-t entered its
Memorandum Decision and Order 011 November 26,2007 in which it denied the Thomasons'
motion for relief fro111 tlleprior judgment aild for a new trial. R. Vol. I., pp. 120-136. The court
further ordered that, to tile extent the Fraud on the Court document filed by the Tl~omasons
constituted a separate request for relief, it was denied. R. Vol. I., pp. 137-138. No appeal was
taken fronl the decision of the bankruptcy court. R. Vol. 2., pp. 209-222. (Ba~dcruptcyCourt
Doclcet Repoli reflects that no notice of appeal was filed following the entiy of the banluuptcy
court's Menlorandu~nDecisioll and Order Denying Motion for Relief.) The time fol-filing an
appeal has passed and the Thonlasons did not appeal the bankruptcy court's No~re~nber
26,2007
order.
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On September 26, 2008, Appella~ltsNicholas tho ma so^^ and Sandra Thornason, filed a
Derna~~d
for Retrial and Motion to Dismiss Baillcruptcy in the ballluuptcy court cases. They were
joined in their de~nandand inotioll later by Marilyim and Byron Thomason. After a hearing on
December 10, 2008, the Elonorable Jim D. Pappas entered his Order wherein the Demand for
Retrial and Motion to Dismiss Ba~u'uuptcywas denied. R. Fiftll Affidavit of William Forsberg,
Exhibit 25, p. 4 of the Me~nora~~dum,
lines 2-8. The Thomasons' latest motion in b a ~ h p t c y
court was again based on their allegation of fraud 011 the court. R. Fifth Affidavit of William
Forsberg, Exhibit 25, p. 4 of the Menlorandu~n,lines 9-16.
On December 19,2008, the Tl~omasonsfiled a notice of appeal of the Ba~dauptcyCourt's
Order denying their motion to dismiss b a n l q t c y . R. Fifth Affidavit of William Forsberg,
Exhibit 25, p. 5 of the Me~norandum,lines 2-4: On December 22,2008, the Thomasons filed
their Notice of Appeal on the Banlmptcy Court's Order denying their demand for a new t~ial.R.
Fifth Affidavit of William Forsberg, Exhibit 25, p. 5 of the Memorandum, lines 4-6. III their
briefs, tlle Thomasons expanded tlleir issues to include tl~eirconte~~tiol~
that tlie banlmptcy court
deliberately suppressed pre~iiouslysubmitted docume~~ts
to assist tl~etrustee in obtaining an
illegal claim to an asset. Tlle banlvuptcy court judge allegedly did this because a meinber of his
follner law firm represe~~ted
olle of the parties in tlle litigation. R. Fifth Affidavit of Willia~l?
lines 25-28; p. 8, lines 1-3.3
Forsberg, Exllibit 25, p. 7 of the Memora~~dum,

' 111rejecting this asgume~~t
the appellate court stated, "Eve11 tlloug11 ~neitl~es
the AP
Deinalld nor tl~eCase Demand refers to bias of the judge, and even tl1ougl1 this is not all appeal
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On June 26, 2009, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Balrlmptcy Appellate Panel
entered its Judp~entaffirming the Banluuptcy Court's judgment and Order of Deceniber 10,
2008. R. Fifth Affidavit of William Forsberg, Exhibit 25 (2ndunnumbered page). The Thomasons
have since filcd a petition for further review by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
petition is now pending. Neither the Farinstead property, nor any of the parties to this action are
subject to any stay issued by the bankruptcy court. R. Vol. 2. p. 154.
The only persons or entities with any ownership claim in the Fannstead are parties to illis
action. R. Vol. 2. p. 166. The plaintiff requested by letter that the Tholnasons voluntarily
negotiate a partition of the Farmstead. They refused to do so. R. Vol. I ., pp. 21-22A. The other
interests include the attorney's lien of Jay ICohler which attaches to the ownersllip interest of the
Thoinasons and the property tax anearage owed to Madison County. R. Vol. I., p. 18.
Since 2001, the fannstead has been farmed by Thomason Farms, Inc., and since 2003 it
has been farmed by Double T Farming and Ranching, Inc. without the lcnowledge or conse~~t
of
Madison Real Prope~tyor its predecessor. R. Vol. 2., p. 154,712. Although Thornason Fa~ms,
Inc. and Double T. Fanning and Rancl~ing,Inc. have fanned the Farmstead property and received
the crops therefrom and farm program payments from the federal govenul~e~lt,
the property taxes

of a nlotion for disqualificatioll or recusal ofthe judge, the Appella~~ts
request that we reverse on
these grounds. We will not do so, as these arpneilts have been raised for tlie first time on
appeal, . . . Moreover, Appellants are requesting us to consider evidence not presented to the
banlu~ptcycourl in the context of tl~eAP denland and the Case Denland. . . . Rather they have
appe~ldedto their opening brief four docuinents that were not mentioned in the AP Deil~aildor in
the Case Denland. . . Because the four docuinei~tsappended to the Appellailts' briefs were not
presented to the bailIwuptcy court in the context of the A? Demand and the Case Deina~d,we
cannot consider tl~einin this appeal." (Citations omitted).
Respondent's Brief
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have not been paid and no accounting of the proceeds from the knling of the Farmstead
property or the crop proganl payments has ever been made to Madison Real Properly or its
predecessor. R. Vol. 2., p. 154,1' 3.
11. Additional Issues Presented on Appeal

Madison Real Property is entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs against the
Thornasons.

111. Basis for Attorney Fees on Appeal
Tl~ereare several statutory bases for an award of attorney fees for this appeal:

"

Idaho Code 5 6-545. COSTS OF PARTITION -- APPORTIONMENT TO PARTIES -LIEN. The costs of partition, iizcludirzg reasonable couizsel fees, expended by the plaintiff
or either of the defendants for the comnon benefit, fees of referees, and other
disbursements, must be paid by the parties respectively entitled to share in the lands
divided, in proportion to their respective interests therein, and may be included and
specifiedin tlle judgment. In that case they shall be a lien on the several shares, and the,
judgment may be enforced by execution against such shares and against other property
held by the respective parties. KVzeiz, howevbi: litigation arises between some of the
parties ooizly, the court may require the expense ofsuch. litigation to bepaid by theparties
thereto, 07. aizji of them. (Emphasis added.)
This appeal was brougllt by Byron and Marily~mTllomason and therefore Madison

Real Property is entitled to an award of attorney's fees against them as a cost of partition as set
foltll above.
Madison Real Propei-ty is entitled to attorney's fees pursuai~tto I.C. $ $ 12-120(1) and (3):

Ida110 Code 5 32-120. ATTORNEY'S FEES IN CIVIL ACTIONS. (1) Except as
provided in subsections (3) and (4) ofthis section, in any action where the amount pleaded is
twenty-five tl~ousanddollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allo~iedto t11e pl.n~ailing
party, as pal? of tl~ecosts of i l ~ eaction, a reasonable amount to be fixed by the coust as atton?eyls
fees. . .
Respondent's Brief
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"I.C.

5 12-120(3) . . . allows recovery for attonley fees by the prevailing party in any colnlnercial

transaction.'' A "con~mercialtransaction" is defined as any transaction, except transactions for
personal household purposes. I.C. 5 12-120(3).
Madison Real Property's suit against the Thomasons seelcs partition as well as an
accounting and award of its share of the rents and profits collected by the Thomasons over the
years they have exercised sole contxol ofthe property. No amount was specified in Madison Real
Property's pleadings. The Farmstead is an agricultural property and as such is commercial in
nature. The relationships and disputes between the parties are conlmercial in nature. Madison
Real Property is entitled to an award of attorney's fees based upon the amount pleaded being less
that $25,000 and the partition and accounting being conmercial transactions.

In Peekcen v. Loc1w)ood Eizgineei*iizg,B. T/., 148 Idaho 89,218 P.3d 1150, 1172 (2009) the
Supreme Court granted attorneys fees on appeal, reaffirming its prior holding$ that "A'
co~mercialtransaction is defined as any transaction, except transactions fox personal household
11. Slntei: 146 Idaho 868, 881,204 P.3d 508, 521 (2009). It went on to
purposes." Id., C~i.an~er

hold that an appeal from a judgment on issues arising a dispute over the parties' respective rights

(3) In any civil action to recover on a11 open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable
instiument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or
services nlzd ill.ai~jiconznzercial tmizsnction uizless otherwise provided bji la^^, the prevailing
party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected
as costs. (En~phasisadded.)

The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all tra~~sactions
except tra~~sactions
for personal or housel~oldpurposes. The tell11 "party" is defined to mean any person, partnership,
corporation, association, private organization, tl~estate of Idaho or political subdivision thereof
Respondent's Brief
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over ter~ninatio~~
of a joint venture, falls under tiledefinition of a "co~nrnercialtravlsaction." Here
the Tho~nasons'appeal is from a dispute over co-tellants rights on partition of commercial
agsicultural property, includiilg Madison Real Property's right to an accounting and to be paid its
sl~ilresof the rents and profits from the property. This relatioilship also falls under the clefillition
of a coinmercial transaction.
Idaho Code § 12-121 "provides that '[iln any civil action, the judgemay award reasonable
attorney's fees to the prevailing pasty. . . .' Such an award is appropriate wl-~e~l
this Court has the
abiding belief illat the appeal was brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably or without
foundation." BfIA Im~estmerzts,Irzc. 11. State, 138 Ida10 348, 355, 63 P.3d 474,48 1 (2003) (citing

I.C. 5 12-121).
IV. Ar,oument
1. Issues not wroperlv raised in the district court or preserved for appeal sl~ouldnot be
considered for the first tivne on aoweal.
Thomasons have raised a number of issues for the first time in this appeal. In several
cases, tllese issues also have not been identified with sufficient specificity. Tl~eseissues include:
A. Failure of tl~ecovlveyance to Madison Real Property because the inst~u~nent
of

conveyance did not include a covllplete address;
B. Madis011 Real PropeiTy's stallding to bring the case;
C. The district court allegedly igiloring the appellai~ts'filings and affidavits
against the respo~ideiltas well as their evidence and argunleilts and objections to responde~~t's
motion for suil1mar)ijudgmei~t;
Respondent's Brief
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D. Suimnary judgment should not have been granted where discovery was not
conlplete;

E.The district court abused its discretion when it granted Madison Real Property
attorney fees; and,

F. The district court abused its discretion when it appointed referees.
As pointed out previously, Marilynn and Byron Thomason filed the notice of appeal.
Nicllolas and Sandra Thomason did not file a notice of appeal and should not be included herein.
Michall~v. Mbclanllc,

P.3d -,

2009 WL 3353048 (Idaho 2009), the Supreme

Court held, "It is well established that a litigant may not remain silellf as to claimed error during
a trial and later raise objections for the first time on appeal." Id., qziotiizg Bnrnaore v. Bnrnaore,
145 Idaho 340,343, 179 P.3d 303,306 (2008). "Additionally, substantive issues will not be
considered for tllefirst time bn appeal. Accordingly, this court will not consider any issue on
appeal that [the appellant] failed to properly preserve during trial. Because [the appellant] chose
to relllain silent during tlle entirety of the trial proceedings, this Court can consider vely few, if
any, of the issues that [tile appellai~t]raises on appeal." hfichalk, at p. 3.

In Merr"il11~.Gibson, 142 Idaho 692, 132 P.3d 449 (2006) this court held "[the appellant]
has not identified the clainled statutory violation with sufficient specificity to enable us to
address it, and even if such specificity were prese~lted,it appears that the issue was uot preselved
for appeal by presentation to the trial court." Furfiler, that "[appellant] has not raised a single
issue on appeal that could be considered 'fairly debatable."'h4errill, 142 Idallo ai 697, 132 P.3d
at 454. See nlso I E B Erzteiprises, L.P.v. Snzedlgi, 140 Ida110 746,754, 101 P.3d 690, 698 (2004)
Respondent's Brief
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(issues not raised below will not be considered on appeal); Nelson

11. Arzclersoi? Lunzber

Co., 140

Idaho 702,712,99 P.3d 1092, 1102 (Ct. App. 2004).
Althougl~each of these issues will be discussed hereil~separately, tl~iscourt should not
consider any of these issues in this appeal because they were llot raised before the district court at
the appropriate times and preserved for appeal below.
2. The district court has subiect matter iurisdictio~lover this case.
The Thomasons argue that the district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over
this case. They base tl~eirargument 011 two things (1) their allegation that a deed conveying the
Farmstead to Madison Real Property did not have a cornplete address; and (2) their allegation
that the conveyance of title from Greg and Diana Tllomason to William Forsberg was a
fraudulent conveyance and therefore void.
Subject matter jurisdiction is a ltey requirement for the justiciability of a claim and camlot
be waived by consent of the parties. Sierra L(j%Ins. Co. v. G~aizata,99 Idaho 624, 626, 586 P.2d
1068, 1070 (1978). Because of the serious ramifications of a court acting without subject matter
jurisdiction, namely that the judgme~~ts
of that court are void, the concept must h e clearly
defined. Id. Subject matter jurisdiction was first defined in Richardsoz 7,. Rudd,,a case dda~ing
with the predecessor to Idaho Code section 6-501, the statute in issue here:
Jurisdiction over the subject mattel-is the right ofthe court to exercise judicial power over
that class of cases; not the particular case before it, but rather the absbacl power to try a
case o f t l ~ ltind
e
or character of the one pending; and not wlletller the particular case is
one that prese~ltsa cause of action, or under the pa:-ticulal. facts is Uiable before the court
in which it is peilding, 'because of sonle of the iid~erentfacts that exist a11d may be
developed during trial. 15 Idaho 488,494-95,98 P. 842,844 (1908).
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The Supreme Court has adopted a presumptiol~that courts of general jurisdictioil have
subject matter jurisdictioli ullless a party can show otllerwise. Borah

11.

McCnndless, 147 Ida110

73,78,205 P.3d 1209, 1214 (2009).
The district cou1-t in this case had jurisdiction because it is a court of general jurisdiction
and these has been 1x0 showing that subject matter jurisdiction was lacltiiig. First, Idaho's
Constitution provides that "[tlhe district court shall have original jurisdictioll in all cases, both at
law and in equity." Idaho Const. Art. 5, $ 20. Second, the relevant statutes, all part of Idaho
Code, title 6, chapter 5, entitled "Partition of Real Estate" provide for jurisdiction over both the
class of cases presented and over the specific remedy sought. The lawsuit was filed pursuant lo
Idaho Code section 6-501, which reads:
Wi~enpartition mag be had. Wlien several cotenants hold and are in possession of real
property as parceners, joint tenants or tenants in comnlon, in which one (1) or more of
them have ail estate of inherita~~ce,
or for life or lives, or for years, an action may be
brought by one (1) or more of sucli persons for a partitio~lthereof, according to the
respective rights of the persons interested therein, and for a sale of such property, or a part
thereof, if it appears that a partition cannot be made witl~outgreat prejudice to the owners.
The statutory and co~~stitutional
provisions, when talcen together, demonstrate that the
district court, as a court of general jurisdiction, had the authority to hear this matter wl~enfiled
because it was in fact dealing with the partition of real property under the authority granted by
Ida110 Code section 6-501.
3. Madison Real P1.ove1-t~
has standin2 to brine this case.
Tliolilasons, for the first time, arbxe in their brief that Madison Real Property did not have
standing to bring this action. Standing is a subcatego~-y0.f justiciability and is "a prelinlinary
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question to be determined by this Court before reaching the merits of the case." Trozltizer v.
I<ei7zptlzome, 142 Idaho 389, 391, 128 P.3d 926, 928 (2006). Although not fully al-ticulated in

their brief, the basis oftheir argument appears to be that Madison Real Property, LLC has no
interest in the Fannstead property because a deed to Madison Real Property did not have a
"complete address."' They further argue that the district court abused its discretion by ignoring
Idaho Code $ 55-601. This issue was not raised until the Thomasons filed their brief in this
appeal.
The evidence in the record is to the contrary. The address on the deed in question is
Madison Real Property, LLC, Rexburg, Idaho 83440. R. Vol. 2, p. 162, 163. The deed had a
conlplete and correct legal description, named Madison Real Property as the grantee at the above
address, and was recorded by the Madison County Recorder. First American Title Cornpany
issued a litigation guarantee which was in evidenlce before the court at the lime it ruled on the
partial suinmary jud-went motion in which First America11 examined the state of title and issued
its finding that fee simple "title to the estate or interest in the [Fannstead property] was vested in
Madison Real Property, LLC and Byron Thomason, also shown as Byron T. Thomason, and
Nicholas Thornason . . . each as to a11undivided one-third interest." R. Vol. 2. p. 166. Idalio law
recoglizes that the illfor~natioionprovided in a title report is prir7zn fncin evidence of a

5

Idalio Code $ 55-601 provides that "[a] conveyance of an estate in real property may be
nlade by an instrunlent ill writing, subscribed by the party disposing of the same, or by his agent
thereunto autllorized by writing. The na~neof the galltee and his co~nl>lete
rnailiilg address nlust
appear on such instrunt eiit."
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conveyance.~u~ther,
the Tlionlaso~~s
provide no cite to the record to support their allegation that
the address was not complete and this court is not required to scour the record for ally sucll
support. U.S.
1). Rewnld,889 F.2d 836, 853 n.7 (9"' Cir. 1989).
that tlie deed did not contain a complete
Wilere there was no evidence or arpnle~~t.
address before the district court at tile time it rendered its decision, it was correct in finding that
Madison Real Property was an owner of a fee interest in the Farmstead property. In spite of the
fact that the Thomasons filed a lnotion to dismiss for, among other reasons, lack of jurisdiction,
they did not argue that Madison Real Property lacked standing and they did not present any
evide~lceor argument that the address on the deed collveying the Farmstead property to Madison
Real Property was not a "complete address." The evidence before the district court was
unco~~tradicted
that Madison Real Property was a fee owner of the Farmstead property and the
evidence before the district court supported its findiilg and conclusion in its Filldings of Fact,,
Conclusiol~sof Law and Order Granting Partial Sumnary Iudgnent that ". . . plaintiff,
[Madison] Real Property, LLC is a tenant in common wit11 a one-third undivided fee simple
interest in tl~eFarmstead property with the defenda~~ts
Thomasons." R. Vol. 2., p. 250,251.
Tlle Thomasons' failure to raise the issue of a collveyance before the district court
forecloses this Court from considering it in this appeal. Michallc,supra; Mevill,supra.

54-102. Certificate of abstracter -- Effect. When ally abstracter is certified, . . . [it] shall
entitle sucll . . . title report to real estate, certified to or countersigtled and issued by such
al~stracter,to be received in all courts as piinla facie e~iideilceof the existence of the record of
deeds, inortgages and otl~esir~stru~nei~ts,
conveyances, or liens, affecting the real estate
me~~tioned
in sucl? . . . title report, and that sucll record is as described in said . . . title report.
Respondent's Brief
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Idaho case law recobmizes that an address containing sufficient illfonllation to identify
and locate an addressee is a "complete address" for purposes of conveying seal estate, In Adaiizs

v. Alzderson, 142 Idaho 208,210-211,127 P.3d 111, 113-114 (2005), the SupremeCourtheld
that a Record of Survey containing the name of the grantee, although the record "does not state
outright that Oberbillig is the grantee, a glance at the survey shows he is receiving part of Myers
property, inalting him the grantee. Finally, altllough Oberbillig's address is not shown, the lot,
block, street, county, and city are all shown on the Record of Survey. . . Given the a~nountof
detail provided in the Record of Survey, it would not be difficult to ascertain Oberbillig's street
address." See also City ofKellogg 12. Mission Mountairz Interests Ltd., Co., 135 Idaho 239, 16
P.3d 915 (2000) (a conveyance agreement providing only the name ofthe city contained a
sufficient address since the City of Kellogg is a well-lcnown municipality in Idaho).

In ICeb Eizterprises, L.P.7;. S~izedley,140 Idaho 746, 101 P.3d 690 (2004), the supreme
Court held that an address on a quitclaim deed collsisting of "Cannen, Le~nhiCounty, Idaho"
was sufficie~~t
to comply with Idaho Code 8 55-601. The district court held tl-rat even though the
grantee ]nay have had a post office box, because Carmen, Idaho, was sparsely populated, the
address consisting onIy of the town and county was sufficient.
The address on the deed before the district coud was sufficient to be a complete address
under the standards the Supreme Caul? has applied in similar cases.
The Thomasons are also asltiilg the Court to consider evidence not presented to the
district court and not a part of the record. They have included tluee'exl~ibitsin the Appellants'

Respondent's Brief

Page 18

Joint Appendix that were not presented to the district court or mentioned by the Tlion~asonsas a
part of their pleadings and lnemoranda to the district court.7These exhibits should n0.t be
considered in this appeal. Oynmu v. Slzeelznn (In re Slzeelznn), 253 F.3d 507, 512 n.5 (9"' Cir.
2001) ("Evidence that was not before the lower court will not generally be considered on
appeal"). As noted inifii.sclzrzer v. Uiziden Cor.p. qfAm., 842 F.2d 1074, 1077-78 (9"'Cir. 198S),
"We are here concerned only with tile record before the trial judge ~lhe71his decision was nzade."
Ifii.schner, 842 F.2d at 1077, quotiizg Uizited States 11.Wallcer, 601 F.2d 1051, 1055 (9"'Cis.
1979) (Afiidavits that "were not part of the evidence presented" to the trial court would not be
considered on appeal.) (emphasis in ICirsclz7zer). In deciding whetller the district court abused its
discretion in granting partial sununa~yjudgment, this Court should consider only the record
before tl~edistrict cou~fwhen the decision was made.
4. Tile district court did not abuse its discretion bv finding that the ririous issues decided

bv tile bankcmatcv court in arevious litigation involving these ~artieswere res iudicata.
Tl~o~nasons
argue the district court abused its discretion by failing to find that various
issues previously litigated in two adversarp actions in the banlmptcy court were contested
material issues of fact upon which the district court should have denied granting summary
judgnent.. The substance of the pre~~iously
decided issues raised again in Thomasons' brief is as
follows:

7

Exhibits B, C and D of Appellants' Joint Alq~endixare not found in the record, altllougl~
pages B. 1-4 appear to be copies of similar deeds that can be found in the record witl~out
ce~tificationdata that appears to have bee11added October 13,2009, after tl~erecord was filed
wit11 tile Suprenle Court.
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A. The district court failed "sun spoizte" to review and consider all levels of

jurisdiction. (Citing a letter and a nleinorandum of a verbal agreement betweell Charles, Doralee,
Byron, Nicholas and Greg Thoinason in Decenlber 1984, which the Tholnasons assert is an
encu~nbranceon the Farmstead or a trust.) Appellants' Brief, pp. 16 and 17. That Madison Real
Property has no greater right than the grantor William Forsberg has when he took title to the
Fannstead with actual Icnowledge that there was a trust. Appellants' Brief, p. 17.

(I) The district court did not abuse its disci-elion by failing toJirzd that the
Farnzstead proper@ was encunzbered by a trust where the issue had been previouslp litigated to
aJinaljudgment.

The Thomasons now claim it was error that the district court did not undo the final
judgment of the ba~lluuptcycourt because they now wani to claim the property belongs to a trust.
In an earlier pleading in this case, the Thomasons quote the following language from the
"trust" in support of their coi~tentions:
"above property will remain in the direct and equal ownership of Byron, Nicholas, and
Greg Tl~omason,as long as Byron, Nicholas, andlor Greg Tllolnason continue .to fann. In
the event of their (Byron, Nicliolas or Greg) death or voluntary leaving the farm
operation, their individual payout will not exceed the $20,000 . . . and all rights and
clainls are callcelled for above said property. " R. Vol. 4., p. 745.
It t u ~ ~out
i s the Tl~onlasonsalso made i~lucliof the "trust" docunents in the ba111mptcy
coul? adversa~yaction where title was quieted ill Willia~nForsberg. Not coincidel~tally,the
ba~luulptcycourt quoted the sarile language the Thomasons now argue the district court abused
its discretion by not filidil~gto be a inaterial issue of fact, and held as follows:
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"Plaii~tiffsByron, Marilylul, Nicholas and Sandra argue that Greg and Diana did not have
the ability to transfer their interest in the propeity to Mr. Forsberg in 2001 and 2002 because of
tile tenns of an earlier written lneinoral~dumof agreement executed by Charles, Doralee, Byron,
Nicholas and Greg on August 25, 1991. Ex. I. According to Plaintiffs, that memorandu~nwas
executed to document a verbal agreeniei~tentered into by the family meinhers in Deceinbe~
1984." The written agseement provides in pa~t:
This memorandum is to acknowledge a verbal agreement entered into between Charles
andDoralee Thomason and their now surviving sons, Byron, Nicholas, and Greg
Thoinason in December 1984. [sic] In which it was agreed that Charles and Doralee
would transfer the following properties . . . [Teton Pastures and Framstead] and cattle to
Byron, Nicholas and Greg Thomason. The house and homestead property . . .is to be
transferred [sic] solely to Byron Thomason. . . . The above vro~ertvwill remain in the
direct and eciual ownership of Bvron. Nicholas. and Greg Thomason. as long as Bvron,
Nicholas. aildlor Greg Thomason continue to farm. In the event of their (Byron, Nicholas
or Greg) death or voluntary leaving the farm operation, their individual payout will not
exceed the $20,000 . . . and all rights and claims are cancelled for above said property.
Ex. 1 (emphasis added).
The memorandum also provides that "Charles and Doralee could reside in their home as long as
either should live, and that after the deaths of both Charles and Doralee, the sons would establish
a &&$ to benefit Roger's two daugl~ters."~
Emphasis added, R. Fiftli Affidavit of William
Forsberg, Exhibit 24, p. 54-55
The court goes on to a~ialyzethe doculneniand its effect on Greg and Diana Tiionlasons'
ability to coiivey the property and concludes:

1'1 should be noted, although the baidwuptcy court did not specifically address the corpus

of the trust in its opinion, the iilemoralldu~nof agseeine~ltcalled for the trust to be composed of
$20,000.00 cash and that the annual interest fiom the trust is to be paid to Roger's children. R.
Vol. l., p. 83.
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The deed given by Greg and Diana Tl~omasonto Mr. Forsberg colistituted a valid
conveyance of an undivided one-third interest in the Farmstead Property. The
lnemoraiidum of agreement did not restrict that transfer or interest. Mernoralldu~nof
Decision, p. 59, Tlzomasoii.Fn~i~zs,
Iiac. v. G ~ e gThomason, Dinizn Thonzason, et. al. Case
No. 04-6134, entered June 9,2006, consisting of 79 pages, reproduced in its entirety in
Plaintiffs Exhibit, Fifth Affidavit of William Forsberg, Exhibit 24 (submitted by the
Clerk of the District Court with tile Record herein).
It is clear that the document fl~eTl~omasonsare now attempting to characterize as a t ~ u s t
which does not allow tlie conveyance of the property was in fact considerecl and thorouglily
litigated in the adversary proceeding in the banlaptcy court, and the court found against the
Thomasons on this issue. As was held by the coud in its decision granting partial sunuilary
judgment herein, the doctrine of re.7judicatn bars the Tho~nasonsfrom attempting to relitigate
this issue by attempting to characterize it as something it is not. JVnt1n';zs 11. Peacoclc, 145 Idaho
704, 184 P.3d 210 (2008).
Tlie second setof issues raised again in the Thomaso~ls'bnef, wl~icliissues were also
previously decided are:

B. Allegations that amount to an assertion that title to llle Farmstead property passed
fraudulently, including that Greg and Diana Tho~nasoiiwere insolvent at the time they transferred
their interest in the Fanlistead property to William Forsberg, Appellants' Brief, p. 19. That
various types of fraud, batkuptcy fraud, fraud up011 the bankruptcy court were perpetrated by
Williarn Forsberg and the other paities opposing tlle Thomasolls in tlie ba~iluuptcycourt
litigation, and that Greg and Diana Thomason fraudulently transfe~xdthe Fannslead propel?)i to
Willia~ilForsberg. Appellants' Brief, p. 18
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( I j The district court did rzoi en. bji,fiizdiizg that vnriotts nllegntio7zs cffiflttd,
finudtlleizt trnizsfer nizd,finud zrpoiz the cottrl were rcs judicntn.

The Tlionlasons did not pursue tlie issue d fraudulent transfer in the original trial in the
adversary action even tl~ouglithe allegations of fraud were a part of their co~nplaintand all ofthe
allegations they now rnalte would have necessarily been lmown to then? at the time. R. Vol. 1.,
pp. 60-65.
Tile Tlio~nasons'allegations that the conveyance of the property in question was
fraudulent were also raised and decided in a Rule 60(b) motion they filed in the b a ~ h p t c court
y
after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Banluuptcy Appellate Panel denied their appeal of the
ba~dmptcycourt's original judgment. Tile Thomasons raised every issue they are alleging in
their current appeal regarding what they have referred to as the "Unified Fraudulent Transfer
Act," and "Fraud Upon the Court," in their "Denland for Retrial Fraud Uoon the Court." R. Vol.
I., pp. 94-1 18; attached lo the "Joint Affidavits of Nicholas A. Tho~nasonand Byron T.
Thomason," R. Vol. I., pp. 87-1 19; and "Affidavit of Plaintiff Byron T. Thomason, Fraud on the
Court, Bankruptcy Fraud, Exhibits and Claims," R. Vol. 4. pp. 361-630. Following a hearing in
wllich evidence, ilicludillg testimony, was received, the banlciuptcy court ruled against the
Tholnasolis on all is~ues.~See
R. Vol. 1., pp. 120-136 (Memora~~dm~l
of Decision and Order

111a footnote to its me~nora~iduni
decision tlie ba~duuptcycourt had this to say regarding
tlle Thomasons claims, "A postscript is needed here. ~Tliomasons]have sliown tliey lack
discretion in the inalmer in which they allege others are guilty of serious wrongdoing. From their
submission, one migl-it conclude tliey lack any coilscie~~ce
about the scope and reach of their
potentially hurlhl, largely baseless, allegations aimed at otliers. In addition, Plaintiffs' counsel, at
least, is guilty of a laclc o f j u d g i ~ eiin
~ ~enabling
t
his clients, witliout his prior input or review, to
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entered November 26,2007). The Banlcruptcy Coult's decision regarding ownership of the
subject property and all issues regarding the Thomasons allegations of fraud is final and not
subject to further appeal. R. Vol. 2., pp. 209-222 (portion of docket &om the bankruptcy court
adversary case reflecting that no notice of appeal was filed after the court's decision on
November 26,2007). All of the allegations contained in Thomasons' appeal in this case were
decided against them in the adversary case in the bankruptcy court or in their n~otionfor relief
froin judgment. Sea footnote 5, on p. 17, to the Menlorandum Decision of the Ba~dmptcyCourt
on Thomasons' Motion for Relief from Judgment and for a New Trial, Exhibit B to the Affidavit
of William Forsberg.
The matter of the conveyance of Greg and Diana Tholnasons' interest in the Fannstead
property to William Forsberg, subject to his wife's comnunity interest and their title in tlie same
is resjudicata and not subject to relitigation in this court. See M/ntlcins v. Peacocic, 145 Idaho 704,
707,184 P.3d 210,213 (2008).
Res judicata is comprised of true res judicata (claim preclusion) and collateral estoppel
(issue preclusion). Hi7zdi1zai.sh 1). Mocic, I38 Idaho 92,94,57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). Whether
claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars the relitigation of issues adjudicated in prior litigation

file docunlents purporting to be affidavits on his letterhead with the Court. Those pleadings were
not effective nor persuasive. Instead, in thein, the individual Plaintiffs lob scurr-ilous clainls at the
parties, the trustee, opposing counsel, and on occasio~~,
the Court. Plaintiffs and their attorney
risk inlposition of attorney fees, costs and perhaps eve11 more severe sai~ctionswhen they talce
this approach to litigation. The Court adn~onishesthen1 to seeain &on1 sucl~activities in the
future." R. Vol. 1.,p. 136 (footnote 5).
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between the same parties is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review.
Lohman v. F(y~zrz,139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 379, 386 (2003).
Ida110 uses a transactional approach to claim preclusion. U.S. Bnnlc Nntl. Assrz. 11. ICzleizzli,
134 Idaho 222,226, 999 P.2d 877, 881 (2000). "The doctri~ieof claim preclusion bars not oilly
subsequent relitigation of a claim previously asserted, but also subsequent relitigation of any
claims relatillg to the sane cause of action which were actually made or whicli might have been
made." Hiizd77zarsh, 138 Idaho at 94, 57 P.3d at 805. Claim preclusion has thee elements: (1)
same parties or their privies; (2) sane claim; and (3) final judgmel~t.Ticor Title Co. v. Starzion,
144 Idaho 119, 124, 157 P.3d 613,618 (2007).
Here, Tl~omasons'claims are barred by claim preclusion. First, as the Forsbergs'
successor in interest, Madison Real Property is their privy. See id. Second, the issue in Thonznsoiz
v. G i q Thonznsorz, Diaiza Thonznsoiz, et. nl. was the conveyance of Greg and Diana
Farnn, 17%~.

Thomasons' interest in the Fannstead property to William Forsberg -- the same issue the
Thomasons allege was error for the district court not to consider as a contested inaterial fact.
Third, tile b a ~ h p t c ycourt deter~lli~led
that the Farmstead property had been validly conveyed
and quieted title in tl~eForsbergs, and the Banluuptcy Appellate Panel affinned the judgment of
the banlmptcy court. There was a final judgment on the merits in Tizonzason Fnnlzs, Inc, 1). Greg
Thonza.son,Diaiza Tlzonzaso~z,et. nl. Therefore, the doctrine of claim preclusion applies here to
bar the consideratio~iof Tilomasons' claims regarding the validity of the title.
Each of the above issues were raised and decided agaiust tile Thomasons by final
judgn~entsin an adversary action in the banlcruptcy court in wl~icl~
the issue of the ownership of
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the Farnlstead was tried to a verdict." In that action, the Thomasons initially claimed the
Farmstead belonged to a corporation, Thomason Farms, Inc, and later in tl~atcase claimed the
Farinstead had to remain in the ownership of Byron, Nicholas and Greg Thomason because of the
memorandum of agreement they now claim as a trust. All of whicll claims were rejected when
the court quieted title in Miilliam Forsberg.
5. Tile district court did not abuse its discretion when it manted partial summan!
judmnent in favor of Madison Real Propertv where the Thomasons did not raise an\>tilnely
obiection to the mant of ~oartialsummary iudmnent.
The Thomasons argue that the district court abused its discretion in granting partial
sum111ar-yjudgment by "igno~oringthe appellants' iili~lgsand affidavits against the respondent, as
well as, the evide~lceby the appellants, their arguments and objectiolls to the responde~~t's
motion for summa& judgment." Appellants' Joint Brief, p.34. Thomasons furtller argue that
summary judgme~ltshould not have been granted where discovery was not complete. Appellants'
Joint Brief, p. 29. Neither of these issues were raised in district couft,
h~itially,it is clear from an examiilation of the record that it is devoid of any evidence that
the Thomasons objected to tile entry of su~mnaryjudgment, argued agai~lstswmna~y
judgment,
provided any evide~lcein opposition to suimnary judgme~~t,
or requested additional time to
complete discovery. IRCP Rule 56(c) states: "If the adverse party desires to serve opposing

'' R. Fif11 Affidavit of William Forsberg, Exhi17it 24 Meinoratldum of Decision,
Thonzasori.Fnrr~zs,Ihc. 1). Greg !,oii.or~znsoiz,
Dinrzn Ti?onznson,el. nZ. Case No. 04-6134, e~ltered
June 9, 2006, consisting of79 pages.
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affidavits the paity must do so at least 14 days prior to the date of the hearing. Tile adverse party
shall also serve an answering brief at least 14 days prior to the date ofthe hearing." Tile
Thomasons did not to file any affidavits or an answering brief, "Pro se litigants are held to the
same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." Sbiitts 11. A h , 141 Idaho 706, 709,
139 Idaho 442,445, 80 P.3d
117 P.3d 120, 123 (2005) (quoting TwinFalls County 1). Coafes,
1043,1046 (2003)). Moreover, "Pro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration
simply because they are representing the~nseivesand are not excused from adhering to procedural
rules." Nelson 1) Nelson,144 Idaho 718, 170 P.3d 375, 383 (2007) (citingSanzmis v. Magnetelc,
Iiaac 130 Idalio 342,346,941 P.2d 314,318 (1997)).

The record is also cleav that the discovery requested by the Thomasons had been
col~lpliedwith. The Thomasons have not sought any further discovely in the case. It is reasoilable
to infer that the .Themasons did not seek further discovery becauseof the ten year history the

',

Thomasons have litigating the issues they want to continue to press in this case. Evidence of this
is found in the hundreds of pages of documents the Thomasons have illeluded with their notices
of appeal and their motions for reconsideration in this case.

h any event, IRCP, Rule 56(Q provides: "Sl-~ouldit appear from affidavits of a party
opposing the inotioli that the paity can~~ot
for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to
justify the paity's opposition, the court may . . . order a conti~zuailceto permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taliell or discovery to be had. . ." The Thoinasoils did not avail
thenlselves of this procedure, and it is reasonable to conclude that they did not: do so because they
already had all the discovery they thought they needed. Regardless, they did not adhere to the
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lules of civil procedure, and they should not be allowed to claim the district court abused its
discretion when they had the opportunity to raise those issues with the district court and failed to
do so.
As the district court observed in its Order of October 20,2008 denying Thomasons'
motion for reconsideration, a new trialhearing and other relief from the pa~tialsuinmary
judgnte~lent,"[TJhe Tholnasons made ito effort-from

July 1I to August I S to reply to Plaintiff's

summary judgment motion. As of today, defendants have yet to address the underlying merits of
the claims." R. Vol. 4., p. 667. Motions for su~nmaryjudgnent are decided on facts shown, not
on facts that might have been shown. Veipbillis li Depeizdable Appliance Co.. 107 Idaho 335,
337, 689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). The district court did not abuse its discretion in
granting partial summary judgment on the record before it.
'

6 . Matters listed as issues in the Th6rnasons' briefwhicl:, were not argued bv citation to

facts in the record or by citation to s u ~ ~ o r t i legal
n g authority should be dee~nedabandoned.
The Thornasons have listed as issues that the district court abused its discretion when it
appointed referees, when it granted Madison Real Property its attorneys fees based on a s m n a r y
judgment in violation of the appellants constitutiollal rights, and based on the appellants filed a
nlotioll for a continua~~ce
based on the fraudulent aagreenle~~t
by [Madison Real Property's]
counsel that he would have the hearing continued, and appellants being triclced into relying on his
statement, thus denying the Thomasons due process. The Thomasons did not cite any facts in the
record or supporting law for these issues. In the case of the allegation that counsel agreed to
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continue the sununary judgment hearing, the record directly colltradicts the representations of the
Tliomasons in their brief. "
The Supreme Court also held that issues on appeal that are not suppofled by propositiolis

of law or authority are deemed waived and will not be considered. flflleeler ii Idaho Dept. of
Health & ?%!fare, 147 Idaho 257, 207 P.3d 988 (2009); I.A.R. 35(a)(6)."Because [the appellant]
failed entirely to support her argument wit11 citations to any evidence in the record or relevant
legal authority, this Court declined to review the argument." Michalk, at pp. 4-5. The issues
raised by the Thomasons are not supported by citations to legal autholity or facts in the record
should not be reviewed by this court.
7. The district court did not err bv awarding Madison Real Propem1 attornev fees when
the Thornasons did not object to the award.
The Thomasons clalm for the first time in this appeal that the district court should not
have awarded attorney fees to Madison Real Property for prevailing on its motion for partial
summary judgment. Appellants' Joint Brief, pp. 39-40. Without any citation to the record, they
claim that the district court laclted jurisdiction, Madison Real Property and its counsel had
u~~clean
hands, and did not prevail on its motio~~.
Again, the Tl~omasonsdid not raise these issues
wit11 the district court. IRCP 54(d)(6) provides that any paty may object to the claimed costs of
another party set ibltll in a memo ran dun^ of costs by filing and serving on advase parties a

II

hl a letter to tile Thomasoas dated July 3 1, 2008, counsel stated, "After some
consideration, 1. have elected not to rescl~edulethe hearing scheduled for August 18, 2008. . ."
This letter was written in response to letters from the Thomasoi~s.R. Vol. 2., p. 241.
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nlotion to disallow a11 or part of such costs within fourteen (14) days of service of the
memorandum of cost. . . Failure to object to the items in the memorandun of costs shall
constitute a waiver of all objections to the costs claimed." The appellate courts in Idaho have
held consistently with this rule in several cases. Corzner 1,. Dralce, 103 Idaho 761, 653 P.2d 1173
(1 982); Lower717). Board of Courzp Conznzissiorze~s,115 Idaho 64,764 P.2d 431 (Ct. App. 1988).

The Court should not review the Thon~asons'attorney fees issue where they did not object to the
award in a timely fashion ill district court as required by IRCP 54(d)(6) to preserve the issue for
appeal.
8. The district couli did not abuse its discreti011when it denied Bwon and M a r i l m
Thomasons' motion for a continuance of the hearing oil Madison Real Prooertv's motion for
partial summaw iudmnent.
The Thomasons also argue that the d~strictcourt abused its discretion by not grant~ilg
Byron and Marilynn Thomasons' motion for a continuance. I.R.C.P. 56(c) provides that "the
court . . . for good cause shown . . . may continue the hearing [on a motion for surnniary
judg~ne~it].
[The] standard for review of discretion for abuse requires a three-pronged inquiry to
determine whetl~erthe district court (1) conectly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with the legal standards
applicable to the sl~eciiiccl~oicesbefore it; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason
Lea~~itlil.
S~lairz,133 Idaho 624, 63 1, 991 P.2d 349, 356 (1 999); Sun I/nlle,y Shopping Ctr., Inc.
11. Idalzo

P o ~ l eCo.,
~ 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). Absent a clear showing of
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abuse, a district court's exercise of discretion will not be overtu~lled.Appel v. LePage, 135 Idaho
133, 135,15 P.3d 1141,1143 (2000).
The record reflects that Byron and M a r i l p Tllomason did not file any objection, brief,
affidavit, deposition or other evidence in opposition to Madison Real Property's motion for
partial sumnlat-yjudgment before or since the date of the hearing. The motion for a co~ltinuance
was filed the Friday before the Monday the hearing was to be held on. That Madison Real
Property's attorney did not agee to continue the hearing and opposed it. That none of the
Thornasons (including Nicholas and Sandra Thomason who did not move for a conti~luance)
appeared at the hearing. Based upon the record the district court found that the Thomasons had
not established good cause to grant a continuance, and therefore de~liedtheir motion.
The district court denied the motion, recognizing its discretion to do so under the
permissive language of Rule 56(c). The distict court acted within its legal boundaries as the facts
did not support that there was good cause for a continuance. The district court reached its
decision after hearing Madison Real Property's counsel's objection to the conti~~uance
and after
considering the facts before it. There has been no "clear showing of an abuse of discretion,"
therefore the Court should affirm the district court's ruling in tlle conti~ruance,
V . Conclusion

Wit11 regards to their c o ~ ~ l p l a iof
~ ~lack
t s of jurisdiction, and fraud, baliauptcy fraud,
fiaud upon the court and fraudulei~ttransfer, the Tl~on~asons
invite tl~eCourt of Appeals to
engage in a far reaching exploration of ten years of litigation by the Thomaso~lswit11 wl~icl~
they
are not satisfied. Wit11 regards to their co~nplaintthat Madison Real Propeity did not have
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standing, they are attenlpting to use doculne~ltsillat were not before the district courl and not to
be found in tlle record, to reverse the holding of tile district court. The othe~issues raised by the
Thomasons in this appeal were not raised in the district court as required by tlie law and rules,
and were not preserved for appeal. The Thoinasoils have disregarded the facts it1 the record, the
law, and the rules of civil procedure in axil. brief.
Tl~isappeal is not suppo~tedby tl~efacts or tile law. The Court should deny the
Thomasons' appeal and affirm the judgment and orders ofthe district court made to date.
Madison Real Property should be awarded its attorney fees and costs for this appeal.
Respectfully submitted this 231dday of December, 2009.

n

,

Wilha~nForsberg
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